PROCESS HAS ITS LIMITATIONS
VALUABLE EXPERTISE IS AVAILABLE TO FILL THE VOID
Over six years ago, Kieth Volkert founded Satellite Consulting, Inc. (SCI) to provide expertise to companies in the space industry. Tapping their pool of 120 senior consultants who are independent contractors, SCI can rapidly assemble expertise to help any company short of experienced engineers. Volkert described the need for “white hair” in the design process, how the need materialized, and how SCI operates to a meeting of the AIAA L. A. Section Enterprise Chapter on August 28, 2007.
A stark reminder of the lack of experience is the large number of insurance claims as a result of launch failures. A significant number of oversights, some dramatic and some less dramatic but nonetheless damaging, are never caught or caught late, and result in failures in orbit. Numerous causes, some interrelated, combine to generate these oversights: over-reliance on process rather than knowledge, schedule pressures, inexperienced staff, inadequate time spent in program reviews, shortage of independent reviewers, smaller customer teams, restrictive government regulations, and financial pressures. Although Volkert’s comments and conclusions are derived largely from commercial satellite programs, the same trends are affecting military programs.

Over-emphasis of Process:

The recent emphasis on integrated product teams (IPT’s) and other collaborative approaches rely on the process to identify design problems. If, however, the members of the team lack sufficient knowledge, skill sets and/or experience, design deficiencies are not caught. Many design mistakes are repetitions of design mistakes made on previous programs that senior consultants like those of SCI have experienced and remember well. The emphasis on process by teams also dilutes the individual responsibility of the members, induces laxity in addressing problems, and inhibits the solution of the problem unless resources outside the team are introduced.

Schedule Pressures:

Customer and financial pressures, plus overconfidence due to ignorance about potential problems, lead to compressed schedules. These in turn lead to the risk of meeting some critical milestone. Sometimes this compression manifests itself in building flight hardware before sufficient qualification testing has been completed. Under these circumstances, the potential for expensive rework or failure in flight is quite evident.

Fewer Senior Experts/Inexperienced Staff:

A large pool of experienced aerospace engineers has reached the age of retirement, with 40 plus years of experience. Many still retain a burning sense of excitement and drive that can fill voids in the current aerospace engineering pool with good effect. They provide a different set of knowledge and, free of distractions from everyday work urgencies, bring a clear focus to bear on potential problems. With their experience comes an awareness that can prevent the repetition of past mistakes on new programs.

Inadequate Time for Program Reviews:

Program Design Reviews (PDR’s) have become shorter. In earlier times they lasted about five days. Now they are lasting about one and one-half to two days. Improved presentation aids (e.g. PowerPoint) account for some time savings, but most of the time reduction stems from less thoroughness in the review process. Discussion - rather than the mere flipping of colorful charts - is needed.

Shortage of Independent Reviewers:

Unless an experienced reviewer is called in from the outside, the reviewing process can easily miss a truly independent assessment of the merits and shortcomings of a design. The independent reviewer is willing to challenge certain assumptions on what works and what doesn’t work, and to apply sanity checks to some of the results shown.

Smaller Customer Teams:

The shortage of experienced engineering practitioners has apparently affected customer team size. Formerly the customer teams attending PDR’s consisted of 15 to 25 individuals. Now the number is more like five. The depth and thoroughness of the review suffer accordingly.

Restrictive Government Regulations:

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) leads to reduced design review packages if the customer is a foreign entity. SCI is required to submit a Technology Transfer Control Plan on such programs. Unfortunately, certain sensitive items cannot be discussed, so that the full potential of the design may not be realized. ITAR has caused U.S. satellite manufacturers to lose some business.

Financial Pressures:

Competitive cost cutting has led to the tendency to hire younger people to save on salaries. Quality suffers due to lack of experience. Cost cutting can also lead to inadequate staffing, compressed schedules, and the misguided building of hardware already mentioned above. The ups and downs of the aerospace and the dawning of the computer age led to the present demographics in aerospace. The rapid growth between 1950 and 1970 slowed down after the moon landings. College enrollments in aerospace fell steeply in the 70’s, and in the 80’s and 90’s, computers and computer science took center stage. As a result, there are now shortages in aerospace engineering at career midpoint.

There is thus a market for the mentoring services offered by SCI. The demand is limited and specialized. SCI assigns consultants, from a pool of about 120, in accordance with the specialties needed by the customer. These consultants sign independent contracts with SCI, and are paid out of billings by SCI to the client. SCI doesn’t actively market to any great degree, but rather gets business by name recognition.
Quality performance by the consultants and an established company reputation are therefore important factors in gaining new business. It goes without saying that national secrets must be protected, but in working with numerous companies, a serious ethical challenge confronting the SCI consultants is to avoid giving away secrets from on company to another company.

Guido Frassinelli 09/25/07